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Abstract
Weshowhow in the hierarchiesFÆ of Fieldian truth sets, andHerzberger’s
HÆ revision sequence starting from any hypothesis for F0 (or H0) that es-
sentially each HÆ (or FÆ) carries within it a history of the whole prior revi-
sion process.
As applications (1) we provide a precise representation for, and a cal-
culation of the length of, possible path independent determinateness hi-
erarchies of Field’s construction in [4] with a binary conditional opera-
tor. (2) We demonstrate the existence of generalised liar sentences, that
can be considered as diagonalising past the determinateness hierarchies
definable in Field’s recent models. The ‘defectiveness’ of such diagonal
sentences necessarily cannot be classified by any of the determinateness
predicates of themodel. They are ‘ineffable liars’. Wemay consider them a
response to the claim of [4] that ‘the conditional can be used to show that
the theory is not subject to “revenge problems”.’
1 The Scope
The purpose of this note is to investigate more closely the hierarchies of truth
sets produced by the revision sequence process. The first hierarchy, the one pro-
duced by Herzberger, [12], [11], was invented to test how various self-referential
sentences in a language containing names for elements of a ground modelM ,
and sufficient to define such diagonalising sentences, would behave under re-
peated applications of the Tarskian definability schemewhich produced repeat-
edly truth sets. Herzberger allowed this process to proceed into the transfinite by
using a liminf rule (all of which we specify in more detail below). This revision
process has been the subject of various investigations and extensions, notably
by Gupta and Belnap in a series of papers, but also in the book [9].
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More recently Field in e.g. [4], has used such a liminf revision process, to
analyse the consequences of adding a binary operator °! to a language similar
to the above, with Tr a truth predicate. Field takes at each successive stage not
just a new level of definability in the Tarskian sense, but a strong Kleenean fixed
point (à la Kripke [15]).
The two sequences of sets we shall dub here hHÆ |Æ 2Oni (the “H-sets”) and
hFÆ | Æ 2Oni (the “F -sets”) (where On denotes the class of ordinals). When de-
fined over the same model, such asM = they are, mathematically at least,
surprisingly similar. Indeed we showed in [22] the stability sets consisting of
those sentences that are in all the H-sets from some point on, and Field’s ul-
timate truth sets are recursively isomorphic - that is there is a pencil and paper
algorithm for converting members of one set into the other, and conversely. Of
course this is not to say that the members of the final sets are the same or have
the same intended meaning. The phenomenon we are seeing here is that the
liminf rule is acting as some kind of very powerful infinitary logical rule. One
can show that whatever one does (within some considerably wide bounds) at
successor steps will be swamped in effect by the limit rule. This is why the two
ultimate sets are, up to recursive isomorphism, the same set.
The present paper can be seen as a refinement of this last work where we try
and get to grips with the question as to what constitutes each of the FÆ and HÆ
sets for individual Æ. Such questions seem not to have been really addressed in
the literature, but we find we need to analyse what is really happening within
these truth-sets and with the liminf rule.
It seems to hard to claim any purely truth-theoretic justification for this rule
and on these grounds the present writer finds the revision theories of truth defi-
cient. (To be fair on Herzberger, he made no claims that his methodology was a
fully fledged theory of truth; Gupta and Belnap ([9]) on the other hand, claim the
rule of revision goes to the very heart of truth, and it is to theories of truth based
on such transfinite revision sequences that the above remark is addressed.) Field
on the other hand makes no claim that the sets of sentences that are ultimately
true are of substantial significance in themselves, or indeed that the construc-
tion has some essential features of a theory of truth: it simply provides a model
demonstrating the consistency of the kind of principles he would like to have.
As he shows, the introduction of a binary °! operator renders certain classi-
cal principles (such as the law of excluded middle in general) invalid. At the
moment we have only a set of principles that are validated by this model’s con-
struction (and those of others which he dubs “G-models”), but we do not have
a theory that is being instantiated by this model. (The same is also true for revi-
sion theories.) The situation is rather different from that of Kripke’s construction
of the Strong Kleene minimal fixed point, which is very clearly tied to a logic, an
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interpretation of connectives, and an axiomatisation.
Martin in [17] in particular, points out that it would be wrong to see Field’s
construction as playing an analogous role to that of Kripke’s for the minimal
StrongKleenefixedpoint (althoughField himself I think is notmaking this claim,
as he does not present this construction as the construction, or as having special
status, but only as demonstrating his principles’ consistency). Martin, inciden-
tally, also voices doubts about the possibility of any convincing theory of truth
that introduces an implication °!.
Field sees an advantage to his models in that they are able to express the
fact that the simple liar L0 sentence is somehow defective, being neither in the
extension of the Truth or the Falsity predicates, for example in the Kripkean con-
struction, in a way that that Strong Kleene logic cannot. This is done by means
of what he calls a ‘determinateness operator’ and which is a syntactic operation
on any sentence A: DA is defined to be A^¬(A °!¬A). In [4] and [5] the con-
struction allows this to be A °! (>°! A) and from this, and the staging process
that assigns values to sentences containing°!, it may be interpreted during the
process at a successor stage as “A holds now, and it did at the last stage.” This
D operation Field iterates, and there is quite a lengthy and difficult discussion
in [5] on the lengths of possible iterations of this operator; and how one might
iterate it along ‘paths’, how such paths may be defined, in a bivalent, or a non-
bivalent manner etc. This discussion is germane probably to any claim about
revenge immunity (which is there for example in the title of [4]) and so it is inter-
esting to see how this unfolds. We believe that, at least in the case of this model’s
construction, it is possible to give an exact description as to the lengths of such
paths that are internally definable within the model. (There is more detail on
this outline below.) Furthermore, externally defined paths of longer length will
be precisely those for which one is diagonalising out of the model. From this
analysis we may define ineffable liars whose defectiveness is beyond capture by
any determinateness predicate of the model; thus the attempt to so capture the
essence of generalised liars can only work on an initial segment of the definable
liar hierarchy.
This all requires a somewhat thorough-going analysis of the mathematics of
themodel construction process, and thus the FÆ-sets that arise. Hence themain
part of this paper is somewhat technical since it perforcemust discover these re-
lationships between these sets, and thus the nature of the ‘internal’ part of the
model. This ‘internal’ is in quotes, since what in fact happens is that a ground
modelM such as is taken and it is extended to a modelM+, in an extended
language with ‘Tr ’ and a binary symbol °!, but which has exactly the same do-
main of elements. So in what sense can we talk of sets of integers say as being
‘internal’? The point is that one can find a formula A(X ) with one free variable
3
for example, and define {n 2M | kA(X /n)k = 1} where “kBk” denotes the ulti-
mate semantic value of a sentence in the construction. In this sense, when us-
ing Tr(A(X /n)) as substituted for this kA(X /n)k, it can be shown that the strong
Kleene minimal fixed point has exactly the hyperarithmetic sets of integers as
‘internal’ to it. One characterisation here is that the internal sets are precisely
those that are both themselves and their complements, inductive over that stan-
dard model of arithmetic. The models of [4] and [5] also have internal sets, and
in particular internal sets defining orderings (and hence ‘paths’) etc. Once we
have constructed such internal paths, then we may safely iterate D along them.
Paths defined ‘externally’ to the model in any way, presumably have no length
restrictions, andwould correspond to some kind of ‘super-determinateness’. We
shall further characterise the internal sets in this type of model construction:
they form in the case of M = a somewhat large but countable initial seg-
ment of the Gödel hierarchy of constructible sets. Then we shall see, taking
some terminology from [2], the internal sets inM+ are precisely those which to-
gether with complements, are ‘arithmetically quasi-inductive’ sets and occupy
the analogous role to the hyperarithmetic sets for the Kripkean construction.
Those internal sets that define wellorderings have those orderings’ ranks strictly
less than some precise bound ≥, defined below, this ordinal taking over the role
of the least non-recursive ordinal for the Strong Kleene minimal fixed point.
Our analysis of both the F -hierarchy, and the H-hierarchy yields comple-
menting results: for any level of the F -hierarchy, FÆ say, has the whole history
of the revision process that built it, coded into it. Indeed there is a uniform
process, so that given FÆ the whole sequence hFØ | Ø < Æi of prior sets can be
retrieved from it (‘uniform’ meaning that the process is the same for each Æ).
Moreover this process is arithmetic, so not of great complexity. An entirely anal-
ogous result holds for the HÆ (this is the ‘Uniform Definability’ result of Lemma
1.3 below). This may perhaps at first sight be surprising. The fact that we can
do this is a somewhat delicate set-theoretical matter (which we shall discuss in
the rest of the paragraph - although this does not directly affect any of the philo-
sophical consequences). It depends on the fact that the ordinal ≥ concerned,
although large proof-theoretically is still in some sense small: it suffices for our
purposes that ≥ ∑ Ø0 where the latter, sometimes called the ordinal of the least
model of full second order comprehension, but more commonly for set theo-
rists, is the least ordinal Ø0 so that LØ0 |= ZF° - Zermelo-Fraenkel with the power
set axiom dropped. Our ordinals are well below that of LÆ whose reals form the
firstmodel of¶13-Comprehension (but above that for¶
1
2-Comprehension) sowe
are safely within this region. Nevertheless a set theoretical analysis of the Gödel
L hierarchy and how sets are produced is needed: it is precisely because of set-
theoretical facts that we can establish the uniformity of the arithmetical retrieval
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process from any FÆ.
We have used a part of this ‘Uniform Definability’ result already in [24]. In
order to effect the retrieval of the whole sequence prior to the Æ’th stage, it is
necessary as a building block, to have first a wellordering of the required length
Æ available. One first establishes that there is such which is also uniformly de-
finable from FÆ (or HÆ). In [24] we were attempting to give a game-theoretic
semantics for the Herzberger stability set and the Fieldian ultimate truth set.
This was to mirror previous results on the strong Kleenean minimal fixed point
by Martin (cf. [16] and [17]) where two players I and II play a game to deter-
mine whether a sentence A was T or F in the fixed point. The possession of
a winning strategy by a player indicated that the sentence indeed had a fixed
value. If the game were of infinite length then no player had such a strategy and
one concludes that neither A nor¬A is in the fixed point. For the Herzbergerian
or Fieldian set, there is indeed such a game but it is necessarily an 989 game,
and must in general run for infinitely many moves, even with a winning strat-
egy for a player. This complexity in the game reflects naturally the complexity
of the stability and ultimate truth sets involved. However to obtain this char-
acterisation we needed not only that a wellordering of length Æ was uniformly
arithmetic in HÆ or FÆ, but moreover that it was uniformly recursively enumer-
able. This observation could then be turned into the result that the HÆ (and FÆ)
sets were non-decreasing in Æ. This result was stated but not proved in [24] and
we discharge the obligation here.
In general since we now know that there is a close correspondence between
theHÆ and the theories of the LÆ further results about theHerzberger sequences
are perhapswaiting to bemined. For example, onemay characterize those levels
HÆ which are models of Cantini’s V F : they are precisely those for which Æ is
ß2-admissible, or equivalently those Æ with the reals of LÆ forming a model of
¢13-Comprehension (these results may appear elsewhere).
In the next two subsections we outline in more detail these results: in the
first the hierarchy theorems we have just discussed, in the second the appli-
cations to determinateness hierrachies. In Section 2 we start the construction
proper. We first produce these results for the H-hierarchy, as there the succes-
sor steps are more conventional and perhaps clearly understood. We establish
the Uniform Definability and the Non-Decreasing results for this hierarchy. In
Section 3 we then see what modifications are needed to claim the same for the
F -hierarchy. In Section 3.2 we establish our claims concerning path indepen-
dent hierarchies. Both Sections 2 and 3 depend intrinsically on some analysis
of the L-hierarchy; these can be treated by the reader uninterested in such tech-
nicalities as a black box, and these ‘Limit Lemmata’ proofs establishing how the
theories of various L∏ (for limit ordinals∏) can be obtained by the liminf process,
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have been hived off to Section 4. Even if the reader wishes to ignore this section,
just some basic knowledge of how the L-hierarchy is created will be needed to
read Sections 2 and 3. For the results on the Fieldian hierarchy we shall need to
assume the reader is familiar with the construction of [4], which is also that of
Ch.16. of [5].
1.1 Truth hierarchies
Recall that the Herzberger sequence results in a ‘loop’ that is first entered at
stage ≥ and repeats at a later stage ß. As established by Burgess [2] the least
such pair (≥,ß) is the least such pair for which L≥ ¡ß2 Lß. We independently es-
tablished that the universal Infinite Time Turing Machine of [10] also enters a
final loop with the same (≥,ß) the first such pair (see [23] for an account of this).
We first used these two facts to prove the results here on the non-decreasing na-
ture of the Herzberger sequence starting with a null, or any recursive hypothesis
or distributions of truth values. We intend here to give direct proofs eliminat-
ing the use of machines, and use directly here the, perhaps more familiar, Gödel
L-hierarchy. We let H∞ denote the ∞’th truth set over of sentences æ in the
language of arithmetic with an additional T˙ symbol to interpret the H sets,LT ,
usingHerzberger’s liminf revision rule, and starting out withH0 =?. (Any other
initial recursive distribution of truth values would have the same effect. Indeed
the distribution can be hyperarithmetic or indeed any H0 at all, as long as it is
an element of L≥.) Thus we recall:
H∞+1 = {pæq | h ,+,£. · · · ,H∞i |=æ[T˙ /H∞]}
H∏ = liminfÆ!∏HÆ =SØ<∏TØ<Æ<∏HÆ if Lim(∏).
We then have that H≥ = Hß = H1 where by the last set we mean the set of
sentences stably true in the sequence of length all the ordinals On. H1 is thus
the ‘stable truth’ set of this process. We demonstrate how, if ∞ < ß then, uni-
formly in ∞, the whole sequence up to that point, hHØ | Ø < ∞i, is arithmetically
obtained from H∞ (Lemma 1.3 below). We use a part of this result to show:
Theorem 1.1 (H-Non-Decreasing)
If Ø< ∞<ß, then in the Herzberger revision sequence H∞*HØ.
The same methods can be used to show that for Field’s construction in [4]
which we showed in [22] essentially constructed a recursively isomorphic copy
of the stability set H≥ of the Herzberger sequence, that we can say the same for
his sets.
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Field does the following (particularising to the case of building truth sets
over the structure of the natural numbersM = hN,+,£ 0,T i).
Each new model MÆ only has the extension of the truth predicate, and the
extension of the operator ! changed, and MÆ,æ assigns semantic values from
{0, 12 ,1} to sentences. MÆ,æ+1 is then the strong Kleenean jumpofMÆ,æ according
to the usual truth tables. A Kleenean fixed point stage has been reached when
MÆ,æ =MÆ,æ+1, denotedMÆ,≠, which is essentially the usual strong Kleene fixed
point computed over the starting model MÆ,0 with a fixed assignment of values
to the conditional. At such starting stages MÆ,0 and all subsequent stages MÆ,æ
up to the next fixed point, conditionals are assigned values as follows according
to a revision-theoretic liminf rule:
|A!B |Æ,æ = 1 if 9Ø<Æ8∞ 2 [Ø,Æ)(|A|∞,≠ ∑ |B |∞,≠)
= 0 if 9Ø<Æ8∞ 2 [Ø,Æ)(|A|∞,≠ > |B |∞,≠)
= 12 otherwise.
We shall freely use the notion of ‘|A|Ø’ (as Field does) for |A|Ø,≠. For our
purposes here, we may define for Ø<ß:
FØ =d f
©hpA °!Bq,1i : |A °!B |Ø = 1™[©hpA °!Bq,0i : |A °!B |Ø = 0™ .
Because of the liminf rule, we thus have for limit ∏ that F∏ includes codes
for those sentences A that either stably have semantic value 1 below ∏, or stably
have value 0. (To see this just look at any A, and see if hp>°! Aq,1i is in F∏ etc.
) Similarly from FÆ+1 one may read off the sentences A that had value 1 (or 0)
at the previous stage: |A|Æ,≠ = 1(0 respectively). Indeed from FÆ one may read
off all the values |A °! B |Æ, and thus all the semantic starting values necessary
for calculating the next Strong Kleene fixed point over those values, in this con-
struction. Those fixed point values are then written into FÆ+1 as defined above.
Because of the same limit rule, the stability sets F≥ and H≥ are verymuch the
same mathematically speaking, and the sequences can be analysed in some-
what similar fashions. Field’s first ‘acceptable point’ ¢0 of his sequence was
shown in [22] to coincide with ≥, and the second with ß. (It is a feature of these
kinds of inductive sequence, that the limit stages are determined by the liminf
rule, which is in effect some form of infinitary rule; and this wipes out differ-
ences in what one does at successor stages; one could even have much stronger
(or weaker) successor stage operations than Field considers, but if we stick with
the liminf rule at limits one again ends up with the same pair of ‘stability’ ordi-
nals (≥,ß) reappearing.1 We then have analogously to the above:
1In [7] he considers changing the conditional°!. We have not checked but strongly conjecture
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Theorem 1.2 (F -Non-Decreasing)
If Ø< ∞<ß, then in the Fieldian sequence F∞* FØ.
We don’t know if there is a simpler direct method of establishing either of
these Non-Decreasing Lemmata. Essentially the original single motivating idea
can be expressed as follows. Firstly, since the H sets encompass iterated defin-
ability, then they should (and do) encode the levels of the L - hierarchy which
is also defined by iterated definability along the ordinals. Secondly, we are suf-
ficiently low down in the L-hierarchy, that the levels are all the ranges of maps
with partial domain ! which themselves are simply defined over those levels.
In particular there are simply defined wellorderings of order type the height of
the structure, definable over the structure itself. (Simple here has a technical
meaning.) If Ø < ∞ are sufficiently closed ordinals, then one should be able to
effectively decode a wellordering w∞ of type ∞ from H∞. Lastly, if this decoding
is effective enough, and the wellordering wØ of type Ø is decodeable from HØ in
the same way, then this will prevent H∞ being a subset of HØ. That is the idea.
Pushing these ideas further we shall in fact have something more:
Lemma 1.3 ‘Uniform Definability’ (i) There is a single uniformmethod of arith-
metically defining the whole sequence hH∞ | ∞ < Øifrom HØ for any Ø < ß. Again
this method is uniform in the sense that it is independent of Ø.
(ii) The same as (i) with the Fieldian sets F∞ replacing H∞.
In the case of a successor Ø= ∞+1<ß we may moreover assert that there is
a single recursive function (thus independent of Ø) F : 2 °! , so that if we set
H = ©hpAq,ui 2 2 | F (hpAq,ui) 2HØ™
then with wØ the well ordering of type Ø of the type sketched above, and u 2
Field(wØ), then, if u has rank ∞ inwØ thenHu =df {pAq | hpAq,ui 2H } is noth-
ing other than H∞ itself. Thus for such Ø we have a way not only of defining
simply a wellorder of type Ø from HØ, but we may recursively recover the whole
prior sequence hH∞ | ∞ < Øi from knowledge of HØ. Again the method is inde-
pendent of Ø. Hence we may think of HØ as always encoding the whole revision
sequence up to Ø. From a set-theoretical perspective, this is just as it should be.
For limit Ø < ß the process is more complicated: it is still arithmetical rather
than recursive, but still can be done uniformly. Again the same is true for the
that for this notion the very same ordinals ≥,ß are relevant: again this is symptomatic of this kind
of strong infinitary rule.
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F -sequence. This Lemma represents the content of the second paragraph of our
abstract.
It is from the Uniform Definability that we get a special kind of reflection in
our sequences: we shall see that any talk about stabilization (or otherwise) of a
formulaB in a hierarchy, can itself be expressed, or reflected, by formulae about,
inter alia, a code of B , that themselves stabilize (or otherwise). This will be put
to use in particular in the next subsection and Section 3.2.
1.2 Determinateness Hierarchies
Field has defined a notion of determinateness that seeks to express the idea that
whereas some sentences (such as a simple liar L0) in, for example, a Strong Klee-
nean fixed point are neither true nor false, that language lacks the expressive-
ness to somehow qualify that liar sentence as having that intermediate status.
In his model of [4] he considers for each sentence A a corresponding sentence
asserting the determinate truth of A. There it is A^(>°! A). This he abbreviates
asDA. In his construction the ultimate value of the simple liar kL0k is 12 , whereas
kDL0k is easily seen to be 0. In turn k¬D Tr(pL0qk has value 1, and thus we may
say that although we cannot assert that the liar L0 is not true we can say that it
is not determinately true. We thus have themeans to express to some extent the
‘defectiveness’ of the liar in not having a 0/1 semantic value. By the usual diago-
nal argument there is however a sentence L1 expressing¬D Tr(pL1q). Again kL1k
is 12 but so is kDL1k. Basically this is because, whereas the simple liar L0 alter-
nates in value from 0 to 1 or back again at every stage,DA - which asserts “A now
and A was true at the previous stage” (to paraphrase: we took>°! A to express
the latter conjunct) when D is applied to L0 this must be static at zero. Change
the periodicity of the alternation, say from every stage to every two stages - as is
the case with L1 - then DL1 will itself switch from 0 to 1 and back again, switch-
ing from 0 to have value 1 every fourth stage. However instead DDL1 can be
seen to have value 0 everywhere. Defining L2 to be equivalent to ¬D2 Tr(pL2q)
a similar analysis holds, where now L2 has a periodicity 3. Field then defines
iterations DnA in the obvious way and a transfinite iteration D!A is taken as
(the formal version of) “8nTr(pDnAq))”. We may then define D!+1A as DD!A
and so forth, For eachDÆ so defined there is a generalised liar LÆ with, amongst
others, the properties that kLÆk= 12 = kDÆLÆk but kDÆ+1LÆk= 0.
Field asks then for how long this process may continue. In [4] he mentions
that this can be done at least up to some recursive ordinal∏0. In [6] it is remarked
that this is too restrictive and that it can be done for all recursive ordinals. In the
latter paper and the book [5] there are lengthy discussions as to how to define
first ‘path dependent hierarchies’ of theD operator, and even ‘path independent
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hierarchies’. In essence one wants a path of iterations of D , and for finite ordi-
nals, or recursive ordinals, there are orderings readily to hand along which to
effect this. (For recursive orderings there are the Kleene O notations to ‘name’
ordinals below!ck1 - the first non-recursive ordinal, to effect this - cf. [21].) Field
would like the iterations of the ‘D-operator’ to lead to concepts and notions of
determinateness of increasing strength, but if these notions depended on the
path (read: ordering or ordinal notation system) used, this is rather undesirable.
What we want are ‘path independent hierarchies’ which lead to notions so inde-
pendent. There is some difficult discussion on this, but it seems that, at least for
the principalmodel under discussion ormaybe its counterpart when the ground
model is not arithmetic, but somemodel of set theory of the formV∑- the collec-
tion of sets of rank less than some ordinal ∑, the upshot is that such hierarchies
are of some unspecified, or ‘fuzzily defined’ length which ‘fall short of the first
acceptable point’ ([6]).
It is part of our task (which we sketched in [25]) to bring some clarity to this
discussion, at least for models of the kind described in [4] and [5]. Here this
‘principalmodel’ construction allows one to internally definepaths in themodel
M+ up to ¢0(M ) the first ‘acceptable ordinal’ over the model. We thus end up
with two tasks, to establish a) how to explicitly get such paths - in essence biva-
lently defined prewellorderings and b) an explicit and exact upper bound on the
lengths of such.
One might ask whether that has exhausted the possible ‘path independent
hierarchies’ that Field envisages, but we see no sensible mechanism for this be-
yond what we have proposed. Could we then claim that we have listed all possi-
ble notions of strengthened determinateness? Indeed one of our results below
(Lemma 1.7) explicitly says that there are no paths at all of the kind we describe
that are longer than ours. Hence there are no such internally defined notions
of determinateness beyond, or stronger than, what we have produced here. It
would seem then that an externally defined path of length longer than ¢0 is just
what one does not want: from that one can define all the internal paths and
could then easily diagonalise out of the sets defined from the model.
Proposition 1.4 There are sentencesC 2L + so that for any determinateness pred-
icate DB with B 2 Field(π) kDB (LC )k = 12 . Thus the defectiveness of LC is not
measured by any such determinateness predicate definable within the L + lan-
guage.
This is proven in the final subsection of Section 3. These are our examples of
diagonalised sentences whose defectiveness is not encompassed by any DB for
B genuinely in Field(π): they are the ineffable liars.
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In the Kripkean construction over the standard model of arithmetic one can
define for any sentence A, Ω0(A) to be the least ordinal Æ (if it exists) so that
A 2 ©Æ+1, where h©Ø | Ø < !ck1 i enumerates the stages building up the Strong
Kleenean fixed point. Wemay define a formula P0(v0,v1) inLT˙ so that if Ω0(B) #
and if A is any formula, the P0(pAq,pBq) has a definite semantic value of 0 or
1 and then Ω0(A) < Ω0(B). We do something similar here using the idea of a
sentence becoming stably true (or false) rather than becoming simply true or
false in terms of the extension and anti-extension of the Kripkean construction.
This is the idea behind the function Ω and formula P¡ of the next paragraph.
For a sentence A we may define Ω(A) to be the least ordinal Ω (if it exists)
in a revision sequence so that the semantic value of A is constant from stage Ω
onwards. Wemay define in the languageL + a prewellordering ¡ of sentences of
stabilizing truth value: we set P¡(pAq,pBq) if and only if Ω(A)< Ω(B), where pAq
is an integer Gödel code for A. (It has to be shown that we can do this and that
P¡ is given by an L + formula.) We could do this just for sentences stabilizing
just on 1, or on ‘designated truth values’, but we do this here for 0,1 only. The
ordering π derived from ¡ is a prewellordering since naturally many sentences
A may stabilize at the same ordinal. Letting kAk be the ultimate semantic value
of the sentence A, in the modelM+, we then show:
Lemma 1.5 There are formulae Pπ(v0,v1), P¡(v0,v1) inL + so that for any sen-
tences A,B 2L +, we have
kP¡(pAq,pBq)k = 1 iff Ω(A) #,Ω(B) # and Ω(A)< Ω(B);
= 0 iff Ω(A) #,Ω(B) # and Ω(A)∏ Ω(B);
= 12 otherwise.
(And similarlymutatis mutandis for the formula Pπ.)
The construction of these formulae P¡ and Pπ will build on the work of the
above. We abbreviate A ¡ B for kP¡(pAq,pBq)k = 1 etc. Then, if kAk = 1 (or
0) say, then {B : B ¡ A} = {B : kP¡(pAq,pBq)k = 1} is a prewellordering of order
type some ordinal ª < ¢0. It is less than ¢0 since, recall, that any sentence that
stabilizes must do so by ¢0 by the latter’s definition.) We let Field(¡) denote the
set of sentences stabilizing on 0 or 1. The next lemma shows how long these
prewellorderings can be:
Lemma 1.6 For any ª < ¢0 there is a sentence A = Aª in Field(¡) with the order
type of {B |B ¡ A} equalling ª.
That this is as far as one can go is shown by:
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Lemma 1.7 Let Q(v0,v1) be a formula of L +. Define n ¡Q m if kQ(n,m)k = 1.
Suppose ¡Q is a prewellordering, and further that for any m 2 Field(¡Q ), it is a
bivalent matter for any n 2 whether Q(n,m). Then ot(¡Q )∑¢0.
The assumptions are thus that Q defines a prewellordering, ¡Q , so that, to
rephrase, for anym 2 Field(¡), for any n 2 kQ(n,m)k 6= 12 . The bound of ¢0 is
attained by the ordering P¡ above. This then delimits the kind of determinate-
ness hierarchies of the kind we have been considering to have lengths strictly
less than ¢0.
We now have the wherewithal to define internal hierarchies of iterated de-
terminateness along initial segments of ¡ given by the sets {B : B ¡ A}. We may
define for any sentenceC :
DC (A)¥8B°P¡(B ,C )! (8y(y = pDB (A)q! T (y)))¢.
For C 2 Field(π) this defines a ‘genuine’ determinateness hierarchy of length
Ω(C ). However it is not a bivalent matter as to whether a general C is or is not
in Field(π). (In other words Field(π) is not a crisp subclass of .) However if
C 2 Field(π) then it can be shown that it is a bivalent matter whether a general B
is ¡-belowC or not (Lemma 3.8 below).
Because of the presence of sentences C for which we cannot bivalently as-
sign a 0/1 semantic value to “C 2 Field(π)” the expression “hDB (v0)|B ¡Ci forms
a determinateness hierarchy” is not in the classical part of the language L + to
which the Law of Excluded Middle holds. I believe that this gives a precise for-
mulation to Field’s idea that ‘O is an iteration ofD is ‘fuzzy’ ’ in this context ([6],
Sect.17). Lemmas 1.6 and 1.7 give the extent of such hierarchies.
The ‘ordinals internally L +-definable’ are thus for us the ordinals ª < ¢0,
which we define through our use of stabilizing sentences and the ordering π.
Although the latter has order type precisely¢0 (by Lemma2) there is no sentence
± stabilizing precisely at stage ¢0. Thus the internally defined determinateness
hierarchy breaks down, not fuzzily, but precisely, at ¢0. There is no internally
definable maximal hierarchy. Externally we see exactly what is going on, and
could of course, define a hierarchy of length¢0 using the full field of the ordering
¡.
If one takes the formula P¡, then for any ordinal ± with ¢0 < ±< ß (where ß
is the next acceptable point above ¢0) there will be an ordinal ª with ± < ª < ß,
and there will beC so that {B : |B ¡ C |ª = 1} is a prewellordering under¡ of order
type ±>¢0 and further, definingDC (A) as above:
|DC (A) forms a determinateness hierarchy|ª = 1.
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However this is only an evaluation at a non-acceptable point ª, and the seman-
tic value of such when evaluated at ¢0 or ß is quite different, as it must be by
Lemma 1.7.
There is some discussion in [6] (see, e.g. Sect. 12) about the plausibility, or
otherwise, of defining DÆ operators that somehow with the index Æ considered
as a variable, allow one to define an operator that quantifiers over all possible
Æ. We have defined DC for any sentence C . One might be tempted to quantify
over all C and thereby introduce some further hyper-operator. The discussion
of the last paragraph shows this to be fruitless, since the DC for unstabilized C
are not really determinateness hierarchies. However we have no need to do any-
thing like this: the ineffable liar sentences DC (LC ) already escape being mea-
sured in their defectiveness by any determinateness operator expressible within
the model.
Thus, viewing the construction of the model dynamically, there are longer
paths, hierarchies, prewellorders etc, but they are evanescent: they appear for a
while in the revision process, but then disappear: ¢0 is the sum total of all the
hereditarily definable ordinals. It is the least ‘fuzzy’ ordinal in that it is the least
ordinal which is not the length of a ‘stabilized’ or ‘bivalently defined’ or ‘inter-
nal’ wellordering.
Acknowledgements: I should like to thank Leon Horsten, Graham Leigh, and
Toby Meadows for their comments on an earlier draft, but most particularly the
referee for his cogent suggestions for a substantial improvement to the presen-
tation of the technical arguments.
2 The construction
We shall be able to conclude that for all limit ordinals Ø, that there is always a
wellordering of , wØ, of order type Ø which is recursively enumerable in HØ,
uniformly in Ø. Here ‘uniformly’ means that the definition does not depend on
Ø but is the same for all limit Ø less than ß (the fact that there is such a definition
at all depends crucially on the defining property of ß). In slightly finer detail it
will be asserted that there is a recursive (1-1) function G : £ °! , so that
if wØ = {¡ u,v ¬ 2 | 9i 2 G(i ,¡ u,v ¬) 2 HØ} then wØ is an ordering of type
Ø, for Lim(Ø). Now, towards a proof of Theorem 1.1, if Ø< ∞< ß are both limits,
and we supposed that H∞ µ HØ, then G°1“H∞ µ G°1“HØ. However this would
be absurd as then we should have w∞ µ wØ and thus wØ has a suborder of type
∞! This is the contradiction. This proof then depends on the construction of G
which, perhaps surprisingly, turns out to be not a trivial matter. We also have
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the minor irritant of having to deal with those ordinals Ø,∞ etc. not limits. This
we shall get by noting that not only is H∏ ∑T HØ (for any Ø with ∏ ∑ Ø < ∏+!)
but there is in fact a uniform way independent of Ø and ∏, of (1-1) recursively
reducing any such H∏ to any such HØ.
In fact it is possible to regard this paper as chiefly about the construction of
two recursive functions, aG =GH just described, and anotherGF for the Fieldian
hierarchy. Theway this has been achieved is to demonstrate that the L-hierarchy
hLÆ | Æ < ∏i is uniformly arithmetical in H∏. Then from known facts about the
L-hierarchy, we deduce the existence of the required wellorderings w∏ etc.
We have taken ¡ °,° ¬: £ °! to be some fixed recursive bijection.
We shall further use standard terminology from recursion theory. We shall use
the Kleene notation of {e}X to denote the e’th partial function recursive in X ; the
domain of this function is denotedW Xe . We shall as usual write A ∑T B to mean
that A is Turing reducible to B , which in turnmeans that the characteristic func-
tion of A is recursive in B . A ∑1 B will indicate that A is (1-1) reducible to B : there
is a total recursive (1-1) function f : N! N so that A = f °1“B . We shall quote
without further specifying here standard theorems, such as the snm-theorem
and the (Second) Recursion Theorem (for these and all other facts of this para-
graph see either [20] or [19]). We note that for any X , K X =d f {e | e 2W Xe }, is a
complete ßX1 set (being ß1-definable over hN,X i, and all sets Y recursively enu-
merable (r.e.) in X are (1-1) reducible to it). We set X (0) = X and let X (1) =d f X 0,
the Turing jump of X , to be this set K X , and let X (n+1) be (X (n))0. Let X (!) =d f
{hn,ki | k 2 X (n)}. Then X (!) is the complete arithmetic set over X . Recall also
that if X ∑T Y then X (!) ∑1 Y (!). In our context we have that for n ∏ 1 that
(HÆ)(n) is (1-1) reducible to the complete ßn theory of h ,HÆi. Further, (HÆ)(!)
is (1-1) reducible to HÆ+1 (in particular for any e W HÆe ∑1 HÆ+1). We let G1 be a
recursive function witnessing this last reduction.
Lemma 2.1 (i) There is an effective procedure for testing HØ to determine if Ø is
a multiple of !. (ii) For ! > n ∏ 0 there is a sentence øn so that Lim(∏)! (Ø =
∏+n+1$ øn 2HØ).
Proof: Firstly we note that we can always tell fromHØ whether Lim(Ø) or not:
we look and see if both L0 and ¬L0 are absent from HØ where L0$¬T (pL0q) is
a simple Liar sentence. By the Herzberger rules, this happens precisely at limit
Ø. Let ø0 be the sentence ¬T (L0)^¬T (¬L0). Then ø0 is true in h ,Hµi (and
hence is in Hµ+1) iff Lim(µ). Now set for n ∏ 1, øn ¥ Tn(ø0)). Then for n ∏ 1,
h ,Hµi |= øn iffµ=∏+n where ∏ is the largest limit less than or equal to µ.
Q.E.D.
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Lemma 2.2 (i) There is a (1-1) total recursive function f0 so that for any limit ∏
and any n <!, then H∏ = f °10 “H∏+n+1.
(ii) Moreover the sequence hH∏+k | 0 ∑ k < ni is uniformly recursive in H∏+n
for any such ∏ and n 2N.
Proof: There is an effective list of indices E = hek | k <!i for recursive func-
tions Fk , with the property that for k > 0, ek is an index of the function Fk so
that Fk (s) is the gödel code of the result of adding k applications of T to the sen-
tence with gödel code s. (Here F0 = {e0} is taken as the identity function.) Let f
be the following function, which is recursive in X µ :
f (s)= 1 if s 2 X , L0 › X and ¬L0 › X or
if Fk+1(s) 2 X where k is least so that øk 2 X ;
= " otherwise.
Then for some index e of the function f , if X = H∏+k for any k < !, H∏ =
W Xe . But in generalW
X
e is (1-1) reducible to K
X . That is for some total recursive
G , W Xe = G°1“K X . We combine this with the fact that for any Ø < ß, there is
a total recursive function h witnessing KHØ ∑1 HØ+1 (this is because KHØ is ß1
definable over h , · · · ,HØi). We take f0 = h ±G . This finishes (i). (ii) is similar.
We shall show that there is a (1-1) recursive partial function hX : N£N ! N,
partial recursive in any set X , so that for any limit ∏ ∑ ß, and for any n 2 N, if
X =H∏+n , then hX is total, and H∏+k = {s | hX (k, s)= 1} for k < n.
Define
h(k, s)= 1$ for the least n such that øn°1 2 X {en°k }(s) 2 X ;
h(k, s)= 0$ for the least n such that øn°1 2 X {en°k }(s) › X ;
h(k, s)="$ there is no such n.
Then h(k, s) is a function partial recursive in X , and when X = H∏+n then it
is total with hH∏+k | 0∑ k < ni recursive in H∏+n as required. Q.E.D. Lemma 2.2
We seek to generalise the last observation on the definability of allH∏+k from
H∏+n (for k < n) to all Ø< ∞<ß. We shall show (in Lemma 2.11 below) that:
The sequence hH∞ | ∞<∏i is uniformly arithmetic in H∏ for any limit ∏<ß.
Combining this then with (ii) of the last Lemma we shall have the uniform
definability of hH∞ | ∞<Øi from HØ for any Ø<ß.
In our construction of the L hierarchywe shall assume, somewhat non-standardly,
that L0 =V! =HF the hereditarily finite sets. This is just tomake the numeration
of our induction stages easier. H1 contains all truths of arithmetic, and via a re-
cursive function all truths of hHF,2i, hence it makes sense to start constructing
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the LÆ’s with L0 =HF. We express this well known fact concerning Th(hL0,2,i)
and Th(hN, · · · ,i), that is H1, as:
Lemma 2.3 [Ackermann, cf [18] IV.3.22] There is a (1-1) recursive bijection k :
°! so that hHF,2i |= æ $ h ,+,£, . . .i |= k(æ). Consequently the theory
Th(hL0,2i) is recursively isomorphic to H1.
Weshallmake use of codes forwellfounded relations, whether they bewellorder-
ings or the 2-relation on (usually) transitive sets. If hM ,2i is a structure, withM
a transitive countable set, we say that EM µ is a code for hM ,2i if there is an
bijection f : $M , andwe have for n,m 2 that f (n) 2 f (m)()hn,mi 2 EM .
In short we have that h ,EM i is isomorphic to hM ,2i. A code for a wellorder is
merely the special case when M 2 On. It is occasionally useful to have subsets
of rather than all of coding wellorders. Such a subset is then the field of the
coded wellorder.
We shall assume the reader is familiar with at least some of the details of
the usual construction of the Gödel L hierarchy. In particular the inductive con-
struction of hLµ+1,2i from the structure hLµ,2i. This is effected by looking at all
subsets X',~y of Lµ definable using first order formulae in the language of set the-
ory, '(v0, y1, . . . , yk ) with parameters ~y = yi from Lµ. In our setting to follow, it is
a fact that given the complete theory of the countable model Lµ - Th(hLµ,2i) - as
a set of gödel numbers from , and given also any code for hLµ,2i in the sense
above, call it rµ say, one may by simple arithmetical operations on rµ and the
given theory, construct a code for hLµ+1,2i.
Definition 2.4 (i) The ßn-Theory of hLÆ,2i) will be abbreviated as T nÆ ; the com-
plete theory will be denoted TÆ.
(ii) For Lim(∏), the Liminf theory at ∏ is bT∏ =d f liminfÆ!∏TÆ.
We shall define two total recursive functions l ,g , on which the construction
will depend. The first of these will depend on the following lemma whose proof
is deferred to Section 4.
Lemma 2.5 (H-Limit Lemma) For limit ∏∑ ß the ß2-theory of hL∏,2i, T 2∏ , is r.e.
in bT∏. Moreover an index for this r.e. reduction is the same for all such ∏.
Lemma 2.6 There is a total recursive function l , so that if ∏∑ß is any limit ordi-
nal, and for any e, if (i) for all Æ < ∏, TÆ =WHÆ+1e and (ii) for all limit µ < ∏ we
haveW
Hµ
e =N, then T∏ =WH∏+1l (e) .
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Proof: Our assumptions in (i) and (ii) allow us to conclude that
liminf
Æ!∏
WHÆe = liminf
Æ!∏
WHÆ+1e = bT∏.
Let a recursive (1-1) g¯ be chosen (using e) with the property that g¯°1“HÆ+1 =
WHÆe (for all Æ). The above equations translate then to:
g¯°1“H∏ = liminf
Æ!∏
g¯°1“HÆ = liminf
Æ!∏
g¯°1“HÆ+1 = bT∏.
(The first equality holds, as the reader may check, as the liminf operation com-
mutes with g¯°1; the middle equation holds because in turn HÆ = liminfØ!ÆHØ
for Lim(Æ), Æ < ∏.) However T 2
∏
is uniformly r.e. in Tˆ∏ (by Lemma 2.5 and in-
dependently of ∏). This implies that T∏ ∑1 (H∏)(!). However there is a recursive
and totalG1 witnessing that (HØ)(!) =G°11 “HØ+1 for all Ø. Using this latter equa-
tion with Ø = ∏ and putting it with the above, we can effectively find an index
l = l (e) with T∏ =WH∏+1l (e) . Q.E.D.
The second function g will depend on:
Lemma 2.7 There is a recursive (1-1) function G2 so that for Succ(Æ), TÆ is (1-1)
reducible to (TÆ°1)(!), i.e. so that: TÆ =G°12 “(TÆ°1)(!).
This will also be proven in Section 4.
Lemma 2.8 There is a total recursive function g , so that if Æ< ß is any successor
ordinal, and for any e, if TÆ°1 =WHÆe , then TÆ =WHÆ+1g (e) .
Proof: LetG1 be the fixed recursive functions from above so that for any Æ<
ß H (!)Æ =G°11 “HÆ+1. For any e let Z (e)=WHÆe . Z (e) is thus a possible candidate
for TÆ°1, depending on the choice of e. Now we have TÆ ∑1 (TÆ°1)(!), via the
fixed functionG2 of Lemma 2.7. Thus TÆ =G°12 “(TÆ°1)(!).
Let He be a fixed function depending on e which witnesses that Z (e)(!) ∑1
H (!)Æ . Hence Z (e)
(!) = H°1e “H (!)Æ . Let Ge be the (1-1) function He ±G2. Then in
case Z (e)= TÆ°1, we shall have that TÆ =G°1e “H (!)Æ . Finally let g (e) be an index
so thatWHÆ+1g (e) = (G1 ±Ge)°1“HÆ+1. Again if Z (e)= TÆ°1, then TÆ =WHÆ+1g (e) .
Q.E.D. Lemma 2.8
Lemma 2.9 There is an index e0 and thus a (1-1) recursive functionGL so that for
all Æ<ß: (i) W HÆ+1e0 = TÆ; (ii) TÆ =G°1L “HÆ+2.
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Proof: We proceed to define f (e,n) a partial function recursive in an arbitrary X .
The indices g (e), l (e) use the functions g ,k, l from the lemmas 2.8, 2.3, 2.6 above.
f (e,n)= 1 if p(T˙ p0= 0q)q › X ^n 2 k°1“X ;
or if ø0 2 X ^ {l (e)}X (n) #;
or if neither L0 nor ¬L0 is in X ;
or if ø0 › X ^ (L0 2 X _¬L0 2 X )^ {g (e)}X (n) # .
In all other cases f (e,n) ".
By the Recursion Theorem there is e0 so that for any X , {e0}
X (n)= f (e0,n).
Claim: 8Æ<ßWHÆ+1e0 = TÆ. For Lim(Æ) we have liminfØ!ÆW
HØ
e = TˆÆ.
Proof: By induction on Æ, including additionally the claim that for Lim(Æ)
thatWHÆe0 =N. For Æ= 0 this is trivial. If true for Ø where Æ= Ø+1, then let X =
HÆ+1. Then ø0 › X ^ (L0 2 X _¬L0 2 X ) and thusWHÆ+1e0 = dom({g (e0)}X )= TÆ as
required. If now true for Ø<Æwhere Lim(Æ) then we have neither L0 nor ¬L0 is
in X =HÆ, and thusWHÆe0 =N.
Still with Lim(Æ), if X = HÆ+1, as ø0 2 X , WHÆ+1e0 = dom({l (e0)}X ) = TÆ, the
latter equality by our fulfillment of the conditions to apply Lemma 2.6.
Q.E.D. Claim.
The Claim proves (i) of course, and (ii) then is immediate (since for any e,
WHÆ+1e is (1-1) reducible to H
(!)
Æ+1 ∑1 HÆ+2, the latter via G1 as remarked above).
Q.E.D. Lemma 2.9
We shall make use of the following corollary to the proof of Lemma 2.5 (also
proven in Section 4):
Corollary 2.10 (Wellordering Lemma) (cf. [8]) There is a single recursive func-
tion G : £ °! , so that for any limit ordinal Ø, if we set
wØ = {¡ u,v ¬2 | 9i 2 G(i ,¡ u,v ¬) 2HØ}
then wØ codes a well ordering <Ø of of type Ø.
Proof of Theorem 1.1.
Let f0 be fromLemma2.2 (i), andG the function justmentioned in theCorol-
lary 2.10. For a subset A µ £ , let (A)1 =df {m | 9nhn,mi 2 A}. Suppose
Ø ∑ ∞ and let Ø = !.k + l , ∞=!.k 0+ l 0 for some k ∑ k 0. Suppose we assumed
H∞ µHØ. Then by Lemma 2.1 (ii) wemust have l = l 0. However we also have that
(G°1“ f °10 “H∞)1 µ (G°1“ f °10 “HØ)1 (if l > 0), and (G°1“H∞)1 µ (G°1“HØ)1 (if l = 0).
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Either alternative implies thatw!.k 0 is a wellorder of type!.k 0 contained inw!.k
a wellorder of type !.k. Thus k = k 0. Thus Ø= ∞. This completes the theorem.
Q.E.D. Theorem 1.1
(Moreover this last proof is also the basis of the “non-wellfounded” version
mentioned in [24], if, for example, we tookØ an ordinal and c likewise an ordinal
in the illfounded part of the ordering, (with largest limit ordinals less than them
of Ø0 and c 0 respectively thenwe’d have thatwØ0 would containwc 0 as a suborder
- but this is also absurd, as wc 0 is illfounded).
We now turn to our claims that the whole sequence up to a stage is recover-
able from that stage: Lemma 1.3(i). We first consider limit ordinals ∏.
Lemma 2.11 Let ∏ < ß be a limit ordinal. Then hHÆ | Æ < ∏i is uniformly defin-
able over L∏. Moreover a code for this sequence can be found uniformly arithmeti-
cally in H∏.
Proof: From above we have a wellorder, <∏ from the relation w∏, of order
type ∏ that is uniformly ßL∏2 . That is, there is a ß2 definition of a binary rela-
tion, that works over any limit ∏ < ß to define w∏(n,m), a wellordering of that
length. (To see that it is ß2 over L∏, recall that H∏ itself is ß2 over L∏ and w∏ is
(G°1“H∏)1.) Consequently wemay define a code for the iteration of our revision
sequence along this ordering:
H∏(k,m)$hL∏,2i |= “ 9 f 9n[n 2 Field(w∏)^Fun( f )^dom( f )= {p |w∏(p,n)}^
^8u(
(u is <∏-least °! f (u)=?) ^
(u a <∏-successor of v °! f (u)= {pæq | h ,+,£, . . . , f (v)i |=æ}) ^
(u a <∏-limit°! f (u)= liminfv<∏u f (v)) ^
^k 2 f (m)].”
The relationH∏(k,m) codes hHÆ |Æ<∏i: ifÆ<∏ andm is such that |m|<∏ =
Æ then HÆ = {k |H∏(k,m)}. Due to the uniformity in the definition of w∏ this
(ßL∏4 ) definition ofH∏ is independent of ∏.
For the last sentence of the lemma: since T 2
∏
is r.e. in H∏, andH∏ is arith-
metical in T 2
∏
, we have thatH∏ is then arithmetical in H∏, again all uniformly.
Q.E.D. Lemma 2.11
Thus for such ∏ we have a way not only of defining simply a wellorder of
type ∏ from H∏, but we have a single method for recovering the whole prior se-
quence hH∞ | ∞ < ∏i from knowledge of H∏. We now marry the above Lemma
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with Lemma 2.2.
Proof of Lemma 1.3 (i) for the H sets:
For Ø a limit the last lemma shows us how to decode the whole sequence up
to Ø from HØ in a way that is uniform for all such limits Ø < ß. We have also
seen in Lemma 2.2 that if Ø= ∏+k where ∏ is the largest limit ordinal less than
Ø how to recover k, and the sets H∏+k 0 for k 0 < k. Since from H∏ we may define
hHÆ |Æ<∏i, wemay recover a code for this sequence in a recursiveway fromHØ.
Finally wemay glue together this code with those of the finitely many sets H∏+k 0
for k 0 < k, (taking care to do this in a way that only depends on k) to get a code
for hHÆ |Æ<Øi arithmetically from HØ. Q.E.D. Lemma 1.3 (i) for the H-sets.
3 The Fieldian F∞ sets and determinateness hierarchies
In this section we consider how the above needs modifying to obtain the same
results for the Fieldian hierarchy. In the second part we see how to define deter-
minateness path hierarchies.
3.1 The F -hierarchy
The point of the definition of our FØ, is that it encapsulates the semantic values
of the sentences A at stages in Field’s construction prior to Ø: if Ø = ±+1 then
FØ encapsulates the semantic values of all |A|±,≠ at the end of the ±’th round
through an inspection to see if it contains h> °! Aq,1i or hpA °! ?q,1i; or if
Lim(Ø) then the values of those > °! A etc. that stabilize. Given then FØ we
have the complete distribution of semantic values needed to proceed to calu-
lating the Ø’th round of a fixed point. This fixed point is built up in a stan-
dard fashion for a three valued Strong Kleene logic. Thus, for example, the first
stage builds up semantic values |Tr(pAq)|Ø,1 equalling 1,0, 12 depending on the
set FØ alone. (Field resets all values |Tr(pAq)|Ø,0 to 12 at the start of each ma-
jor stage.) Thus |Tr(pA °! Bq)|Ø,1 equals 1,0, 12 depending on whether hpA °!
Bq,1i, hpA °!Bq,0i or neither is in FØ. Consequently any arithmetic statement
©0 true in the structure h ,FØi is then, apart from some inessential syntactic
coding, a true arithmetic statement © in the basic values |Tr(pA °! Bq)|Ø,1; i.e.
|Tr(©)|Ø,2 = 1 and hence |Tr(©)|Ø = 1. (This corresponds, when building up the
firstminimal Strong Kleene fixed point over arithmetic, to having the extensions
of Tr initially empty, and then all basic arithmetic truths (in the Tr-free part of
the language) are then immediately placed into the extension of Tr at the very
next stage, and so end up in the fixed point.) In short, it suffices to consider the
sequence of sets FØ when thinking how the ultimate truths in themodel are built
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up, and we shall not always distinguish ©0 from the coresponding implicit © in
the above.
We let hø∂ | ∂ ∑ ßi enumerate in ascending order ADM§, the closed and un-
bounded sequence of admissible ordinals together with their limit points, below
ß. We set ø0 = 0, and thus ø1 =!ck1 . It can be shown that ø≥ = ≥ and øß =ß. Note:
not every limit of admissible ordinals is admissible.
Essentially we want to rerun the argument for the H-sets but for the F -sets:
the difference is that at each stage instead of using definable sets of the previous
level to go one level up in the L hierarchy, from LÆ to LÆ+1 when going from HÆ
toHÆ+1, we take awhole admissible jumpup: from LøÆ to LøÆ+1 when going from
FÆ to FÆ+1.
Just as we did for the H sets we make some simple observations about suc-
cessor steps.
Lemma 3.1 (i) There is an effective procedure for testing FØ to determine if Ø is a
limit ordinal.
(ii) For !> n > 0 there is a sentence øn so that
8Ø[øn 2 FØ$9∏(Lim(∏)^ (Ø=∏+n))].
Proof: (i) Let K be the Curry sentence equivalent to T (pKq)°!?. Then
Lim(Ø)$ |K |Ø = 12 $hT (pKq)°!?,1i,hT (pKq)°!?,0i › FØ.
For (ii): |K |∏+n alternates value between 0 and 1 for 0< n <!; suppose n > 0.
n = 1$h(K ^¬K )°!?,1i 2 F∏+n . So we may take ø1 to be (K ^¬K )°!?.
n = 2$h>°! ø1,1i 2 F∏+n .
n = 3$h>°! (>°! ø1),1i 2 F∏+n and so forth adding “>°!” for each ex-
tra increase in n. Q.E.D.
Above we have indicated how the FØ sets fit into Field’s description of his
model, and indeed the sets encapsulate everything we get to know about the
model and the set of ultimate truths, which we shall denote F≥ = F¢0 , and we
obtain that kAk equals 1,0, 12 depending on whether h> °! A,1i, hA °!?,1i or
neither, is in F≥.
In the context of the F -hierarchy, FÆ+1 is a complete ¶1,FÆ1 set of integers,
essentially by considerations originating with Kripke (cf. [22] Prop. 2.5) and be-
cause of this we can recursively recover the complete ß1-Theory of hLøÆ+1 [FÆ],2
,FÆi from FÆ+1 (cf. [22] Prop. 2.6). The method of recovering this theory does
not depend on Æ. We shall use the notation that jK (F ) = G where G is the
set of ordered pairs hA, i i of sentences that come True (for i = 1) (or False for
i = 0) in the minimal Strong Kleene fixed point over the starting value distri-
bution coded into F . Hence for each Æ : jK (FÆ) can be read off from FÆ+1:
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hA,1i 2 jK (FÆ)$ h>°! Aq,1i 2 FÆ+1 (and similarly for hA,0i m.m.). It is this
‘Strong Kleene jump’ that produces for us Field’s hierarchy.2
Of course FÆ+1 gives us the complete ß2 theory of hLøÆ+1 [FÆ],2,FÆi as well:
the latter is recursive in the Turing jump of FÆ+1: F 0Æ+1. In our terminology from
above, from this we shall also have that T 2øÆ+1 ∑1 F 0Æ+1 in a uniform fashion. This
is stated as (i) of the next Lemmawhich is proven as part of Lemma 2.2 from [22].
(Note in [22] F∂ here is called essentiallyC∂ there.)
Lemma 3.2 For ∂<ß (i) T 2ø∂+1 ∑1 F 0∂+1 uniformly in ∂.
(ii) Lim(∂)^Lø∂ |=ß1-Separation°! T 2ø∂ ∑1 F∂, uniformly in ∂.
For the limit case, in [22] Lemma 2.2, this stronger reduction in (ii) of T 2ø∏ ∑1
F∏ was shown only uniformly for those ∏ with Lø∏ |= ß1-Separation: this was
sufficient for our arguments at that time. Howeverwe hadmissed the uniformity
over all ∏ < ß that can be obtained from the F -Limit Lemma 3.3 below. This
gives us then for any limit ∏ that we have T 2ø∏ is uniformly r.e. in F∏, (so a weaker
condition, but a weaker conclusion) and this is just as we had for the H-sets. We
shall need the uniformity to get the ‘uniform recoverability’ property.
The limit level procedures are in the essential mathematical respects the
same: liminf’s are taken, and the Limit Lemma and Wellordering Lemma have
the following unchanged form (and proofs).
Lemma 3.3 (F -Limit Lemma) For a limit ∏ ∑ ß the ß2 theory of hLø∏ ,2i, T 2ø∏ , is
r.e. in F∏. Moreover an index for this r.e. reduction is uniform in ∏.
Hence T 2ø∏ is ß1(h ,F∏i). Just as for the H-hierarchy we shall have (Section
4):
Corollary 3.4 (Wellordering Lemma) (cf. [8]) There is a single recursive function
GF : £ °! , so that for any limit ordinal Ø<∏, if we set
wøØ = {¡ u,v ¬2 | 9i 2 G(i ,¡ u,v ¬) 2 FØ}
then wøØ codes a well ordering of of type Ø.
Lemma 3.5 (i) There is a (1-1) total recursive function f0F so that for any limit ∏
and any n <!, then F∏ = f °10F “F∏+n+1.
(ii) Moreover the sequence hF∏+k | 0∑ k < ni is uniformly recursive in F∏+n for
any such ∏ and n 2N.
2The reader may notice that in [22] we used the slightly different sets CÆ rather than FÆ; there
CÆ contained only pairs of the form h> °! Aq,1i, hpA °! ?q,1i; so an effective subset of what
we are calling FÆ here; but clearly this does not alters the results.
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Proof: Similar to Lemma 2.2 and left to the reader. Q.E.D. Lemma 3.5.
Proof of Theorem 1.2(Non-decreasing)
Employ the same argument as for the H sets, using the functions F from
Lemma 3.5 andGF from Lemma 3.4. Q.E.D. Theorem 1.2
Proof of Lemma 1.3
This will follow from the next Lemma.
Lemma 3.6 Let∞<ß. Then hFÆ |Æ< ∞i is uniformly definable over Lø∞ . Moreover
for limit ∞ a code for this sequence can be found uniformly arithmetically in F∞.
Proof: One should first note that ADM§\ø∞ is uniformly ¢Lø∞1 and its order
type is of course ∞∑ ø∞.
Using Lemma 4.1, uniformly in ∞, there is a ß
Lø∞
2 definable partial map gø∞
of a subset of ! onto Lø∞ . We thus again have a wellorder, <ø∞ from the relation
wø∞ , of order type ∞ that is uniformly ß
Lø∞
2 . That is, there is a ß2 definition of a
binary relation, that over any Lø∞ for ∞< ß, defines wø∞(n,m), a wellordering of
that length. Consequently we may define a code for the iteration of our revision
sequence along this ordering:
(1) F∞(k,m)$9 f 9n[n 2 Field(wø∞)^Fun( f )^dom( f ) = {m | wø∞(m,n)}^
8u(
(u is <ø∞-least °! f (u)=?) ^
(u a <ø∞-successor of v °! f (u)= jK (Ff (v))) ^
(u a <ø∞-limit°! f (u)= liminfv<ø∞u f (v)) ^
^k 2 f (m))].
In the above we have used the function “ jK (F ) = G” which proceeds from
a set of semantic values to its “Fieldian jump”. If ∞ is a limit, this function is
total on such semantic sets and is moreover ¢
Lø∞
1 definable. (To determine G
from F one needs only to go to the least transitive admissible set containing F ,
and the values of G are ß1-definable over it; any F we have is in some Lø± and
then jK (F ) is uniformly definable over Lø±+1 .) However even if ∞ is, say ∏+k +1
with ∏ the largest limit below ∞, one may apply the same function jK to the sets
F∏,F∏+1 = jK (F∏), . . . ,F∏+k = jK (F∏+k°1), and again this is ¢Lø∞1 definable. The
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length of the domain of any such function f occurring in (1) above can thus be
any ∞0 < ∞.
The relationF∞(k,m) codes hFÆ |Æ< ∞i: if Æ< ∞ andm is such that |m|<ø∞ =
Æ then FÆ = {k |F∞(k,m)}. Due to the uniformity in the definition of wø∞ , and of
jK , the (ß
Lø∞
4 ) definition ofF∞ is independent of ∞. F∞(k,m) is thus, uniformly,
arithmetical in T 2ø∞ .
The last sentence of the lemma follows since T 2ø∞ is uniformly r.e. in F∞ if ∞ is
any limit. Q.E.D. Lemma 3.6/
Onemay conclude the proof of Lemma 1.3 (ii) from the last lemma in exactly
the same way 1.3(i) was concluded from Lemma 2.11. Q.E.D. Lemma 1.3 (ii) for
the F .
3.2 Determinateness hierarchies
We address the problem of the length of possible determinateness path hierar-
chies as outlined in Field’s book [5], cf. also [6] where this is also discussed.
We use the above analysis to derive the ‘stabilizing’ formulae P¡ and Pπ that
we have discussed in [25] and appear in the lemmata above.
Proof of Lemma 1.5: We have seen that there is a single arithmetical formula
© that defines over any h ,FØi for (Ø < ß) a wellorder of type Ø together with
the associated previous F -sets hFÆ | Æ < Øi. In particular it means that many
things that we might express in a first order way about the sequence hF∞ | ∞ <
Øi, for example whether a particular sentence A is stably 0, is then translatable
into a standard two valued arithmetic statement in the language of arithmetic
augmented by a symbol for FØ, that is, or is not, true in h ,FØi. We exploit this
to prove the Lemma.
Let X (x) be: “8Æ9Ø>Æ|x|Ø 6= |x|Æ.” This expresses that x has an unstable se-
mantic value. Let A˜X (v0) be the arithmetical equivalent of this using this trans-
lation into the ordinary language of arithmetic, effected in such a way so that
{pBq | h ,FØi |= A˜X (pBq)} is the set of sentences unstable below Ø.
Recall that FØ is the set of ordered pairs hpAq, j i with A a conditional, and
j <2 2 indicating whether |A|Ø,0 = j . Hence, still for such A, we have, for an
atomic clause,
“hpAq,1i 2 FØ”$ |pAq|Ø,0 = 1$ |Tr(pAq)|Ø,1 = 1
and similarly,
“hpAq,0i 2 FØ”$ |pAq|Ø,0 = 0$ |Tr(pAq)|Ø,1 = 0
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with |Tr(pAq)|Ø,1 = 12 otherwise.
Hence our two-valued arithmetic statement eAX about FØ is translatable in
turn to a similar two valued statement, call it AX , but now in the languageL +,
about the truth sets of conditionals Tr(pAq) at stage Ø,1. This holds in a similar
fashion for any arithmetical formula concerning h ,FØi .
Note that kAX (x)k = 0 $ Ω(x) #. Note also that if Ø = ±+ 1 then trivially
h ,FØi |= ¬A˜X (n) for any sentence with code n. However if Lim(Ø) then
h ,FØi |= A˜X (n) is possible if n is unstable below Ø. In that case |AX (n)|Ø,≠ =
|>°! AX (n)|Ø+1 = 1. Wemay thus conclude that
kxk= 1\2$ Ω(x) "$k>°! AX (x)k= 1\2$kAX (x)k= 1\2.
And
Ω(x) #$k>°! AX (x)k= 0$kAX (x)k= 0.
Let®(x, y) abbreviate
“if Æx ,Æy are least so that 8Ø ∏ Æx8∞ ∏ Æy
°|x|Ø = |x|Æx ^ |y |∞ = |y |Æy ¢ then
Æx ∑Æy .”
Now let™π(x, y) be: X (x)_ [¬X (x)^¬X (y)^®(x, y)].
Let A˜™π(v0,v1) be the translation of ™π(x, y) and let Pπ(x, y) ¥ A™π(x, y)
be the corresponding L + formula. We check that Pπ is as demanded by the
Lemma.
Claim:
kPπ(pAq,pBq)k = 1 iff Ω(A) #,Ω(B) # ^Ω(A)∑ Ω(B)
= 0 iff Ω(A) #,Ω(B) # ^Ω(A)> Ω(B)
= 12 otherwise.
Proof of Claim: First set x = pAq and y = pBq. Note that the first line is straight-
forward.
kPπ(x, y)k= 1$kA™π(x, y)k= 1$kAX (x)k= kAX (y)k= 0^Ω(x)∑ Ω(y).
Towards the second line, suppose kPπ(x, y)k = 0. Then x is stable since other-
wise kxk = 12 $ kAX (x)k= 12 which implies that kPπ(x, y)k ∏ 12 . If Ω(y) " then
kAX (y)k = 12 . As ¬A˜X (y) is true for all successor ∞ = ±+ 1 over h ,F∞i, by our
supposition that Pπ(x, y)= 0 we must have for each (successor) ∞ that “¬X (y)^
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®(x, y)” is false over such h ,F∞i. However as ¬A˜X (y) is true this can only be
false over all sufficiently large successor ∞ if Æy is defined over h ,F∞i and is less
than Æx as there defined. But Ω(x) # so Æx is defined as the same ordinal for all
sufficiently large successor ∞. Then wemust have Ω(y) # ^Ω(y)< Ω(x).
The converse is straightforward. And hence kPπ(x, y)k= 12 in the remaining
cases. The definition of P¡(x, y) is done analogously. QED Lemma 1.5.
Proof of Lemma 1.6 It suffices to show that ≥0 =df ot(¡)= ≥. Note first that ≥0 ∑ ≥
since by definition of ¢0 = ≥ it is the least acceptable point, i.e. any sentence
that is going to stabilize will do so by stage ≥. We show that ≥0 ∏ ≥.
For Ø 2On let S1
Ø
=df {Æ | LÆ ¡ß1 LØ}. It is a standard fact, and easily seen, that
if Æ∑Ø is a limit point of S1
Ø
then LÆ |=ß1-Separation.
By the reflection property that defines ≥ as the least such that there is ß > ≥
with L≥ ¡ß2 Lß, onemay show that S =df S1≥ is unbounded in ≥ and has order type
≥. (This is essentially because L≥ |= ß2-Replacement.) Hence, letting S§ be the
set of limit points of S, S§ also has order type ≥+1 (as ≥ 2 S§). And so for ª 2 S§,
Lª |=ß1-Separation.
Since we have a canonical ß
L≥
2 definable partial function g≥;!°! ≥ which is
onto, for anyÆ< ≥ ifnÆ is such that g≥(nÆ)=Æ, the statement©Æ: “nÆ 2 dom(g )”
is part of the ß2-theory of L≥, which itself is true in some LΩ(Æ) onwards. By
Lemma 3.2(ii), for ª 2 S§ the ß2-theory of Lª is uniformly recursive in Fª, (Lª
being a model of ß1-Separation). So letG be (1-1) and recursive witnessing that
T 2
ª
∑1 Fª for any such ª.
We thus have that:
Claim T 2
≥
=Sª2S§\≥T 2ª =Sª2S§\≥G°1“Fª.
Proof: The second equality expresses simply the remarks above about G re-
lating the relevant theories. The first equality is valid since ß2 sentences are ab-
solute upwards from Lªto L≥ for any ª 2 S: suppose ' ¥ 9u8v√(u,v) a ß2 sen-
tence, and that Lª |= 9u8v√(u,v). Then let u0 2 Lª be such that Lª |=8v√(u0,v).
Now we have a ¶1 formula about u0 and such is upwards absolute as Lª ¡ß1
L≥, and so is true in L≥. This ensures that T 2≥ ∂
S
ª2S§\≥T 2ª . Conversely if for
some ß2' ¥ 9u8v√(u,v), L≥ |= ' then again there will be some ª 2 S§ \ ≥ with
Lª |= ': one simply has to find a sufficiently large ª 2 S§ with u0 2 Lª where
L≥ |=8v√(u0,v). Q.E.D. Claim
With this, given the definition of ©Æ above, we see that it is true in Lª(Æ) up-
wards where ª(Æ) is the least element of S§ greater thanÆ. Let then BÆ beG(©Æ).
Then any sentence BÆ has stabilized by stage ª(Æ) at the latest (and kBÆk = 1)).
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Hence the order type of¡ is no less than that of {Æ|Æ 2 S§}. But the latter we have
remarked has order type ≥. This concludes the Lemma. Q.E.D. Lemma 1.6
The argument of the above proof shows that, in contrast to Theorem 1.2, we
can regard F≥ as a simple union, but only along a select subset of ≥:
Corollary 3.7 F≥ =Sª2S§\≥Fª.
Proof: We may imagine running the Fieldian construction inside Lß. Since
the operations involved are highly absolute, we shall have k 2 FÆ, L≥ |=“k 2 FÆ”.
As “k 2 FÆ” is a ß2 sentence, the Claim of the last proof yields this result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1.7
Let Q(v0,v1) be a formula ofL +. Define n ¡Q m if kQ(n,m)k = 1. Suppose
¡Q is a prewellorder and for a contradiction that ot(¡Q ) > ¢0. Letm0 2 have
rank ¢0 = ≥ in ¡Q . Define ¡Ø to be the relation: n ¡Ø m if |Q(n,m)|Ø = 1. It is
by assumption bivalent whether for any other n 2 , thatQ(n,m0) holds. Hence
we have that for ≥ < Ø, for any n 2 , n ¡Ø m0 $ n ¡Q m0. Then for Ø 2 (≥,ß)
“≥ = rk¡Ø(m0)” holds (where rk¡Ø is the ranking function on (the wellfounded
part of) ¡Ø). Hence ≥ is¶1-definable in Lß fromQ,m0:
z = ≥$8ø > z(“if ø= ø∂ and ¡∂,rk¡∂ are defined over Lø∂ then z = rk¡∂(m0)”).
But L≥ ¡ß2 Lß so ≥ is not ß2-definable from integers in Lß. This is a contradic-
tion.
QED Lemma 1.7.
Lemma 3.8 IfC0 2 Field(π) then it is a bivalentmatter for any sentence B, whether
B πC0.
Proof: SupposeC0 2 Field(π).
B πC0 implies k“¬9æB9Ω[æB > Ω = Ω(C0)^ |Pπ(B ,C0)|æB 6= 1]”k= 1 whilst
B 6 πC0 implies k“¬9æB9Ω[æB > Ω = Ω(C0)^ |Pπ(B ,C0)|æB 6= 1]”k= 0.
Using our translations outlined above, the statement within quotes in the
last two lines, has an arithmetical translate about the h ,FØi. For example, “Ω =
Ω(C0)” can be written out using the ‘stability’ formula X (v0) and corresponding
A˜X (v0); this can be used again in conjunctionwith “|Pπ(B ,C0)|ª 6= 1”which itself
can also bewritten out as a fact about theGödel numbers ofPπ,B , andC0, coded
into FØ, for any Ø∏ ª. Q.E.D.
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3.3 Ineffable Liars
Corresponding to his determinateness predicates Field defines generalised liar
sentences Lª as ¬Dª(Tr(Lª)) by the usual diagonalising processes. As he shows
on the initial segment of this hierarchy that he defines in [5], this satisfies the
following:
kDæ(Lª)k= 0 for æ> ª, and
kDæ(Lª)k= 12 for æ∑ ª.
We shall generalise this here as follows. Define as above for any sentenceC :
DC (A)¥8B [P¡(B ,C )! (8y(y = pDB (A)q!Tr(y)))].
To summarise, the order type ofπ is precisely ≥, so that we have notations for
ordinals ª < ≥ using sentences C which stabilize in semantic value at the point
Ω(C ) = ª. We then iterate D ‘along’ the prewellordering π to reach DC . We may
then define liar sentences LC as ¬DC (Tr(LC )). Again these are still sentences of
the languageL + and they obey the above equations:
kDC (LB )k= 0 if kP¡(B ,C )k= 1 and
kDC (LB )k= 12 if kPπ(C ,B)k= 1.
as the formulae on the right reflect precisely the facts thatΩ(B)< Ω(C ) andΩ(C )∑
Ω(B). Just as theL + sentenceDC (A)makes sense, so again does the generalised
liar diagonal sentence LC whether or notC 2 Field(π). These LC forC › Field(π),
as promised in the introduction, furnish examples of diagonalised sentences,
the ineffable liars, whose defectiveness is not encompassed by anyDB forB gen-
uinely in Field(π).
Proposition 3.9 There are sentencesC 2L + so that for any determinateness pred-
icate DB with B 2 Field(π) kDB (LC )k = 12 . Thus the defectiveness of LC is not
measured by any such determinateness predicate definable within the L + lan-
guage.
Proof: We recall the fact that for the first two acceptable points in themodels’
construction ≥,ß (in Field’s notation more sensibly ¢0,¢1) we have that L≥ ¡ß2
Lß (“ L≥ is a ß2-elementary substructure of Lß” where LÆ is the Æ’th level of
the Gödel constructible hierarchy.) Further, as 2 L!+1 and the successive
levels of Field’s construction are performed using very absolute processes, we
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may consider running the construction internally to the L-hierarchy. The ordi-
nals ≥,ß are highly closed, and in fact ≥ is highly admissible. We set ADM+ =
ADM\ADM§ to be the class of admissible limits of admissible ordinals, Wemay
define predicates in the language of set theory that give us the range of seman-
tic values of sentences along Field’s iteration. So that, if ø 2 ADM+ then (|A|∞ =
i )Lø $ |A|∞ = i , in short that is, the construction is absolute to Lø. The discus-
sion of evaluations on p. 254 of [5] indicates what happens for small ordinal
iterations of D : if Æ<æ then DÆ(Læ) cycles through the values 12 followed by an
Æ-sequence of 0’s, and then a tail of 1’s making a æ-sequence altogether, before
looping around again. Dæ(Læ) will cycle through 12 , and then a æ-sequence of
0’s before repeating; finallyDæ+1(Læ) will be an initial 12 at stage 0, but thereafter
always 0. Hence kDæ+1(Læ)k = 0, and thus the ‘defectiveness’ of Læ is affirmed
by this sentence. Essentially the same picture is intended for these extended op-
erators, where now Æ,æ etc. are replaced by sentences B ,C , · · · as notations.
(1) There are ordinals ß> ∞> ª> ≥ and a sentence C with ∞ 2ADM+ and
L∞ |=“Ω(C )= ª.”
Proof: If not, then the following is true in Lß:
y = ≥$ y 2ADM+^Ly |=“8ª9C (Ω(C )= ª)”^
^8y 0 2ADM+(y 0 > y °! Ly 0 |=“8C (Ω(C ) #°! Ω(C )∑ y)).”
Being in ADM+ is a ¢1 notion, as are the satisfaction relations involving
Ly ,Ly 0 . We note that ≥ 2 ADM+. The second conjunct holds since rk(π) = ≥,
and all B 2 Field(π) have stabilized by stage ≥. The last conjunct is our hypoth-
esis. However this would imply that ≥ is ¶1 definable (by the above definition)
without using any other parameters in Lß). But it is not: only sets in L≥ can be
ß2 definable without parameters in Lß (since L≥ ¡ß2 Lß). It particular ≥ itself is
not so definable. Q.E.D.(1)
Let C be as guaranteed in (1). Let ≥¯ < ≥ be arbitrary. Then we have (as a re-
statement, and weakening, of the above):
(2) Lß |=“9∞ 2ADM+(L∞ |= Ω(C )> ≥¯) .”
By ß1-elementarity then:
(3) L≥ |=“9∞ 2ADM+(L∞ |= Ω(C )> ≥¯) ”.
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But ≥¯was arbitrarily large below ≥, thus, in fact:
(4) L≥ |=“8≥¯9∞> ≥¯(∞ 2ADM+^L∞ |= Ω(C )> ≥¯) ”.
The claim is that, staying with this C , that it satisfies the proposition. Pick
any B 2 Field(π). It suffices to show that
(5) 8ø¯< ≥9ø> ø¯(ø< ≥^ |DB (LC )|ø 6= 0).
Proof (5): Taking ø¯ any ordinal greater than Ω(B), then by (3) (with ø¯ as ≥¯
there) there is ∞ 2 ADM+ with L∞ |= Ω(C ) > Ω(B). By choice, ∞ is an admissible
limit of admissibles, so ∞ iterations of the Fieldian construction can be effected
inside L∞. But then inside L∞ we see the usual picture of the cycling semantic
values of 12 , 0,0, , . . . (for Ω(B) steps) and 1’s for Ω(C )°Ω(B) steps, then repeating
this pattern. Consequently, with ø= ∞we see |DB (LC )|ø 6= 0. Q.E.D.(5) &
Proposition.
In fact we can say a little more about such a C : (4) is a ¶2 sentence about
C , true in L≥ and so goes up to be true in Lß. So for such a C , it attains arbi-
trarily large π-ranks, but locally in varying L∞, and then only intermittently, as
the construction proceeds. One may call such aC sporadic. The non-stabilizing
sentences in Field’s model are of two kinds: those that exhibit a periodic be-
haviour with some fixed period ª< ≥, (and for every ª< ≥ there will be such) and
the sporadics likeC , which have no periodic behaviour at all below ß: if we want
to assign a ‘period’ toC it has to be ß itself (for which note that ot (ß\≥)=ß).
There is an entirely analogous result for theHerzberger sequence: in essence
this is only a notational variant of the above. This is done in detail in [13]. Thus
the defectiveness and determinateness hierarchy phenomena can be replicated
in a Herzberger sequence. (This shows that they may be effectively decoupled
from any notion of conditional operator such as Field’s °!.)
4 Proof of the Limit Lemmata
In this section we prove the H- and F -Limit Lemmata. We have alluded to var-
ious set-theoretical facts about the L-hierarchy that are needed to prove these.
We have to establish these here. For those familiar with the Gödel L-hierarchy,
at least the statements of these facts should be understandable and indeed the
proofs use only somewhat elementary concepts.
For those familiar with the Jensen J-hierarchy we make some comments
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now: Because the H-hierarchy is about iterated definability it is convenient to
eschew the J-hierarchy and use the LÆ since these are also created by iterated
definability, and their ordinal height grows in step with the HÆ (the ordinals
heights of the JÆ grow inmultiples of!: On\JÆ =!.Æ). However the well known
lack of closure of the LÆ under even the most basic set theoretical constructs
such as ordered pair, makes for difficulties. In particular we essentially justify in
these lemmata the existence of uniform ß2-skolem functions for limit levels L∏.
Such skolem functions do not exist in general even for the JÆ-hierarchy, and for
the LÆ hierarchy are usually not defined. One has to justify the existence of such
functions even using the JÆ’s. The arguments here are in essence, modifications
of those for the JÆ’s run in [8].
Usually the existence of such functions is problematic for even moderate
sized ∏, and in general uniform versions do not exist. However, as mentioned in
the first section, sincewework below the ordinalØ0, it turns out thatwe are suffi-
ciently low down in the L-hierarchy, so that all is well. This will cause some diffi-
culties for us, but one thing works in our favour which is that we need only prove
the existence of skolem functions, and our results, for limit ∏ and the structures
hL∏,2i.
4.1 Proof of the H-Limit Lemma 2.5
Throughout this proof ∏ will denote a limit ordinal less than ß. For such ∏ we
have a function h∏ which is ß1-skolem function for L∏. These are defined as
follows.
Let h'n | n <!i be a recursive enumeration of all ß1 formulae inL2˙ with say
'n ='n(v0,v1, . . . ,vmn ) with free variables amongst those displayed. Let Æ 2On.
hÆ(n,hx1, . . . ,xmn i) = y() LÆ |='n[y ,x1, . . . ,xmn ]^8z <LÆ y¬'n[z,x1, . . . ,xmn ]
= " (meaning undefined) otherwise.
We treat the right hand side as a definition of the left.
Moreover for any limit ∏, the definition of h∏, it turns out, is itself ß1 and
one can establish that it has the same definition over any L∏0 for any limit ∏0.
The existence of such uniform ß1-skolem functions for L∏, ∏ a limit, is justified
in the same way as over every level of the J-hierarchy (as introduced in [14], and
exposited in [3]; the arguments for the JÆ-hierarchy work here too). By con-
sidering only limit levels each L∏ is closed under finite iterations of the pairing
function as we have mentioned. Hence if x1, . . . ,xmn 2 L∏ so is hx1, . . . ,xmn i and
the above thenmakes sense. The right hand side is defined using<Æ, a wellorder
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of LÆ defined in a canonical fashion, but again for successor Æ this may only be
defined over some later level, such as LÆ+5. For limit ∏ however, all is well, and
the wellorder <∏ is then ¢1 over L∏. We thus shall have:
8~x = x1, . . . ,xmn :
9x0L∏ |='n[x0,x1, . . . ,xmn ]°! L∏ |='n[h∏(n,hx1, . . . ,xmn i),x1, . . . ,xmn ].
Moreover the definition of ß1-satisfaction again can be shown to be a uni-
formly ß1-definable relation of m-tuples and (codes of) ß1-formulae over any
limit L∏. Thus for any X µ L∏ the range of h∏ on !£ [X ]<! is a ß1-elementary
substructure of hL∏,2i, and in fact is the least ß1-skolem hull of X in hL∏,2i.
For any ordinalÆwemay further define the set of ordinalsØ<Æwith hLØ,2i ¡ß1
hLÆ,2i; this is the set of ordinals ß1-stable in Æ, which we shall write as S1Æ.
This notation means that for any ß1-formula 'n and any x0,x1, . . . ,xmn 2 LØ if
hLÆ,2i |= 'n[x0,x1, . . . ,xmn ] then hLØ,2i |= 'n[x0,x1, . . . ,xmn ]. For this section we
revert to the standard terminology that L0 =;. Then notice that Ø ß1-stable in
Æ implies that Ø= 0 or is a limit ordinal (consider the ß1 formula “9y(8z 2 y(z =
∞_ z 2 ∞))” which shows that Ø cannot be ∞+1).
“Æ 2 S1
∏
” is a ¶1-predicate when defined over L∏; again uniformly for any ∏
(the uniformity uses the underlying uniformity of the ß1-skolem function). One
should note that Æ 2 S1
∏
°! Æ 2 S1∞ for any ∞ 2 (Æ,∏] by the upwards persistence
of ß1 properties from hLÆ,2i to hL∏,2i.
We restate what we are trying to prove here:
(H-Limit Lemma) For limit ∏ ∑ ß the ß2-theory of hL∏,2i, T 2∏ , is r.e. in bT∏.
Moreover an index for this r.e. reduction is the same for all such ∏.
Wenow re-run the argument from Lemma 1 [8], but now for the L-hierarchy.
Let '¥9x√(x) be ß2 where√ is taken as¶1.
Claim hL∏,2i |='()9i [for all sufficiently large Æ<∏:
hLÆ,2i |= “9Ø 2 S1Æ((Ø 6= 0^LØ |=')_ (hÆ(i ,hØi) # ^√(hÆ(i ,hØi))” ].
Note that the right hand side here is of the form that for some i theß2-theory
of LÆ eventually from some point on contains the sentence within quotation
marks; this latter sentence we shall call æ'(i ). As ' is an arbitrary ß2 sentence,
this yields the Lemma, since we may express this as ' 2 T 2
∏
$9ipæ'(i )q 2 Tˆ 2∏ .
Proof of Claim: (=)) Suppose the left hand side holds. Suppose S1
∏
were
unbounded in ∏; then for some Ø 2 S1
∏
we should have hLØ,2i |=' and thus 8Æ 2
[Ø,∏] we should have hLÆ,2i |= ' by the above mentioned upwards persistence
32
property. Hence the first disjunct of the right hand side holds. Otherwise let Ø=
maxS1
∏
(whichmay be 0). Wemay consider,H , theß1-skolemhull of {Ø} in hL∏,2
i. In this region of the L hierarchy, for every level: L∞ |=“every set is countable”,
and consequently there is in LØ+1 a function f :!°!Øwhich is onto. Moreover
the <L-least such f is ¢1-definable from Ø. Consequently Ø+ 1 µ H (and so
LØ+1 µ H). The same argument shows that ∞ 2 H °! ∞ µ H (°! L∞ µ H). Thus
H is transitive, and hence is L∞ for some ∞ ∑ ∏. But notice that were ∞ < ∏ then
∞ 2 S1
∏
. But ∞ > Ø so this is a contradiction. Thus H = L∏. Hence every x 2 L∏
is of the form h(n,Ø). But the equation x = h(n,hØi) being ß1 will hold for all
sufficiently large Æ < ∏. If i has been chosen so that the ¶1 √(hÆ(i ,hØi)) holds
in ∏ it will also again hold for all sufficiently large Æ < ∏, as the ¶1 statement
persists downwards. We are thus done.
((=) Suppose the left hand side fails, but the right hand side holds. Then
note that S1
∏
is bounded in ∏: for otherwise we could apply the right hand side
to an Æ in S1
∏
. However then if the first disjunct held for some Ø 2 S1Æ µ S1∏
we should have L∏ |= ', contradicting our assumption. If the second disjunct
held then we have the same conclusion since Æ was chosen in S1
∏
. Hence we
may set Ø =maxS1
∏
. This definition of Ø ensures that there are arbitrarily large
Æ < ∏ with S1Æ µ Ø+ 1\ S1∏. However this latter inclusion shows that again the
first disjunct cannot be true for all sufficiently large Æ, else hL∏,2i |= '. So the
second disjunct must hold instead. Choose i witnessing this, and then for any
Æ large enough take ØÆ so that hÆ(i ,hØÆi) # ^√(hÆ(i ,hØÆi) for some ØÆ 2 S1Æ.
If ØÆ were less than Ø for such an Æ we’d have hÆ(i ,hØÆi) #°! hØ(i ,hØÆi) =
hÆ(i ,hØÆi)^ LØ |=“hØ(i ,hØÆi) #”, and moreover √(hØ(i ,hØÆi) would be down-
wards absolute from LÆ to LØ also. Hence hLØ,2i |= ' and as Ø 2 S1∏, we’d have
hL∏,2i |= ' - a contradiction. Hence ØÆ is always equal to Ø: but as this is the
case for all sufficiently large Æ < ∏ we should also have LÆ |=“√(x)” for such Æ
where x = hÆ(i ,hØi). But this again means hL∏,2i |=' - our final contradiction.
Q.E.D. Claim and Lemma 2.5.
4.2 Proof of the existence of uniformly definable wellorderings
Lemma 4.1 For any limit ∏<ß there is a partial function g :!⇣ L∏ that is onto
which is itself ß2 definable over L∏ (without parameters), and in a way that is
independent of ∏.
Proof: We assume a recursive enumeration h√n(v0) | n <!i of all¶1 formulae of
the one free variable v0. Define
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f 0(n)= hm,Øi
iff the following hold in L∏ :
(i) Ø 2 S1
∏
;
(ii) 9x(x = h∏(m,hØi)) (thus h∏(m,hØi) is defined);
(iii)√n[x];
(iv) 8Ø0 <Ø8m0 <!8x 0(x 0 = h∏(m0,hØ0i)°!¬√n[x 0]);
(v) 8m0 <m8x 0(x 0 6= h∏(m0,hØi))_9x 0(x 0 = h∏(m0,hØi)^¬√n[x 0]).
All of the above statements are Boolean combinations of ß1 and ¶1 state-
ments about their various parameters: (i) and (iii) are ¶1 about Ø and x respec-
tively; (ii) is ß1. (iv) is vacuous if Ø = 0 but otherwise it holds in L∏ if and only
if “8m0 < !8x 0(x 0 = hØ(m0,hØ0i) °! ¬√n[x 0])” holds in LØ. Hence over L∏, it is
a ß1 statement about Ø. (v) Is a finite quantifier in front of a statement saying
that either h∏(m0,hØi) is undefined, or else it is defined but √ is false of it. It is
thus equivalent to a finite conjunction of disjunctions of ¶1 and ß1 statements.
f 0 :!°! L∏ and is ß2 definable over L∏ without reference to any parameters.
Now set f (n)= h∏(m,hØi) where f 0(n)= hm,Øi. Let H be the ß1-skolem hull
of ran( f ). Then H can be realised as the set of all objects of the form
h∏(i ,h f (n1), . . . , f (nk )i. Using a recursive coding of tuples from with , if n
codes hi ,n1, . . . ,nki, wemay set g (n)= h∏(i ,h f (n1), . . . , f (nk )i); g is thus a partial
map from ! onto H . Again g is ß2 definable (from the underlying f 0) over L∏
without parameters. Being a ß1 skolem hull, H is in fact a ß1-elementary sub-
structure of L∏. We claim it is more:
Claim H is a ß2-elementary substructure of L∏.
Proof of Claim: Let g from above have the ß2 defining formula
g (n)= x$hL∏,2i |= 9u©(u,n,x) where© is¶1.
Let, for simplicity, hL∏,2i |= 9v√(v ,g (n))) be a ß2 statement about the sin-
gle parameter g (n) from H (the argument with further parameters in √ is only
notationally longer). We need to show that hH ,2i |= 9v√(v ,g (n)). Pick z so that
hL∏,2i |=√(z,g (n))) and u so that hL∏,2i |=©(u,n,x).
Thus hL∏,2i |=©(u,n,x)^√(z,x).
The latter can be rewritten as a ¶1 formula about hu,z,xi; it is thus of the
form √k (v0/hu,z,xi) where √k is from our original list. As L∏ = h∏“!£ S1∏, so
there is f 0(k)= (m,Ø) satisfying (i)-(v) above, with h∏(m,hØi)= hu0,z 0,x 0i so that
√k (v0/hu0,z 0,x 0i), but now with hu0,z 0,x 0i 2 ran( f )µH . But this means
hH∏,2i |=©(u0,n,x 0)^√(z 0,x 0)
and thus, as g (n)= x = x 0
hH∏,2i |= 9v√(v ,g (n))),
and so we are done. Q.E.D. Claim
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However by our definition of ß the only ß2-elementary substructure of L∏ is L∏
itself. In other words H = L∏ and g is our required partial onto map needed to
fulfill the Lemma. Q.E.D. Lemma 4.1
Proof of Corollary 2.10. This is the main part of the proof of the last lemma: g
is a partial map from ! onto ∏ which has a ßL∏2 definition. In that definition,
no individual property of ∏ was used; hence it is independent of ∏. Thus such
a wellorder w∏ for the Corollary is recursive in T 2∏ which is in turn r.e. in
bT 2
∏
, by
Lemma 2.5. Finally the latter is r.e. in H∏ and hence is ß
H∏
1 . From this a G as in
the Corollary is easily defined. Q.E.D. Cor. 2.10
This process holds together for as long as new ß2-theories of LÆ’s are pro-
duced. However when we reach ß, then ß2-Th(hLß,2i equals ß2-Th(hL≥,2i (be-
cause L≥ ¡ß2 Lß) and it cannot construct a code rß for Lß from it, and the process
breaks down. But that of course is the underlying reason that the Herzberger re-
vision process cycles back at Hß to H≥.
Proof of Lemma 3.3 (F -Limit Lemma I) For a limit ∏ the ß2 theory of hLø∏ ,2i, T 2ø∏ ,
is r.e. in F∏. Moreover an index for this r.e. reduction is uniform in ∏.
This follows from the fact that F∏ is the liminfÆ°!∏FÆ. Consequently just as
T 2
∏
could be found by the argument of the proof of Lemma 2.5’s Claim from H∏,
in an r.e. fashion, T 2ø∏ can be similarly obtained from F∏. Again no particular
properties of ∏ are used. Q.E.D. Lemma 3.3
Hence T 2ø∏ is ß1(h ,F∏i).
Proof of Corollary 3.4 (F -Wellordering Lemma) (cf. [8])
Again this corollary follows in the same fashion as the existence of the func-
tionG in Corollary 2.10. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2.7
Lemma 2.7 There is a recursive (1-1) function G2 so that for Succ(Æ), TÆ is (1-1)
in (TÆ°1)(!) with: TÆ =G°12 “(TÆ°1)(!).
Proof:
(1) A code rÆ°1 for hLÆ°1,2i is uniformly definable from TÆ°1. In fact for some
fixed N <!, it is uniformly recursive in T N+1Æ°1 .
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Proof (1)
Proof: For Lim(Ø) we saw that by Lemma 4.1 there is a uniform ß
LØ
2 defin-
able map fØ : !⇣ LØ for Ø < ß which is essentially, modulo some pairing, the
uniform ß
LØ
2 -skolem fumction which we have at these levels. We then set:
hn0,n1i 2 rØ$
$ hLØ,2i |= f (n0) 2 f (n1)^8n < n08m < n1[n 2 dom( f ) °! f (n) 6= f (n0)^
m 2 dom( f )°! f (m) 6= f (n1)].
We thus are singling out a least element to name f (n0) etc. This is ß2^¶2
definable over LØ. Hence is recursive in T 3Ø (uniformly in such limit Ø) we have
an arithmetic copy or code of LØ. We can run the above argument if we have a
function fØ+k uniformly definable in (Ø and k) over LØ+k such that fØ+k : !⇣
LØ+k .
As is well known, for successor ordinals of the form Ø+k for 0< k <!, LØ+k
is not a terribly suitable model for many of these arguments. For example, it
is not closed under Kuratowski pairs. In Devlin [3] often the assumption of Ø
being a limit is made, in order to simply define many of the known concepts of
L, such as the existence of a definable wellorder <Ø, definable over LØ, and the
existence of ß1-definable ß1-skolem functions. However Boolos in [1] addresses
the problems of defining the necessary concepts uniformly for all Ø. He firstly
uses Quinean pairing rather that Kuratowski pairs, to define a notion of finite se-
quence that does not raise constructibility rank, so that for any x1, . . . ,xn 2 LØ+k ,
hhx1, . . . ,xnii 2 LØ+k . This pairing hh· · ·ii is moreover absolute when defined over
any LÆ. We use here his (I)-(III)
(Ia) The notion of b being first order definable over c can be formalised as
“b fodoc”, and is absolute when defined over any LÆ.
(Ib) There is a sentence Close which is true in any transitive set, and implies
when true in a set t that it is sufficiently closed, so that if c 2 t and b fodoc, then
b 2 t .
(II) There is a sentence æ so that for any wellfounded model hR,Ei, it is a
model of æ iff 9Æ∏!(hR,Ei ª= hLÆ,2i).
(III) There is a binary predicateC (v0,v1) that defines over any LÆ awellorder-
ing <Æ of LÆ with the usual property that Æ<Ø°!<Æ is end-extended by <Ø.
Now granted the above, suppose the definitions to be uniformly ßLÆN°1 for
some sufficiently large N . We may thus for any LØ+k define a ßN -skolem func-
tion h0
Ø+k with the property that h
0
Ø+k“!£!<! = LØ+k . (Here !<! denotes the
finite sequences formed using hh· · ·ii.)
Wedo this in themost straightforwardmanner: define for limitØ∏!,h0
Ø+k (i ,~q)'<Ø+k-
least x so that 'i (x,~q), where 'i enumerates the ßN formulae. By doing this we
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ensure that the skolem hull X = h0
Ø+k“!£!<! is a model of Close and æ. The
transitive collapse of X is then by (II), some L∞ for a ∞ ∑ Ø+ k. We claim that
X = LØ+k . Note that Ø 2 X as the largest limit ordinal is ¶LØ+k1 definable. As Ø is
definably collapsed to ! over LØ+1 by a ß
LØ
2 -definable function, g say, we have
that g is in X and hence Ø+k µ X . This suffices then.
By composing g and h0 with some (ordinary number) pairing we see then
that there is a function fØ+k : !⇣ LØ+k . However fØ+k and h0Ø+k need not be
ß2-definable over LØ+k , but they will be ßN+1 over LØ+k uniformly in Ø< ß and
k <!. Q.E.D. (1)
(2)Uniformly in Æ, we may find a code r for hLÆ,2iwith r ∑1 (rÆ°1©TÆ°1)(N+2).
Proof (2): This mimics the usual construction of LÆ as LÆ°1 together with the
sets first order definable over hLÆ°1,2i. Note that since everything in LÆ°1 is
of the form f (n) for some n, every element of LÆ is definable by a parameter-
free formula of a single variable. We assume therefore a recursive assignment
of gödel numbers with p'(v0)q coding '(v0), the latter any formula of LST with
just the single free variable v0. We set T = TÆ°1, s = rÆ°1. Define:
hn0,0iEhn1, i i=df (i = 0^hn0,n1i 2 s)_ (i = 1^n1 = p'(v0)q^p'(n0/v0)q 2 T .
hn0, i i º hn1, j i=df (i = j = 0^n0 = n1 2 Field(s))_
_[n0 2 Field(s)^ j = 1^n1 = p'(v0)q
^8m 2Field(s)(hm,n0i 2 s$ p'(m/v0))q 2 T )]_
_[i = j = 1^n0 = p'0(v0)q^n1 = p'1(v0)q^
^8m 2Field(s)(p'0(m/v0)$'1(m/v0)q 2 T )].
Then E and º are (1-1) in (s ©T ). Let U = {[!£ 2]º}, the set of º equivalence
classes, then
A= hU ,Ei ª= hLÆ,2i.
In particular if© f defines the uniformß
LÆ
N map fÆ of! onto thewhole struc-
ture LÆ, we can replace E by a code r :
hn0,n1i 2 r $
h!£2,E ,ºi |=“hn0,0i,hn1,0i are finite integers ^ f (hn0,0i) 2 f (hn1,0i)^
^8hn,0i< hn0,0i8hm,0i< hn1,0i[hn,0i 2 dom( f )°! f (hn,0i) 6= f (hn0,0i)^
hm,0i 2 dom( f )°! f (hm,0i) 6= f (hn1,0i))].”
Again we are using the same trick of taking ‘least representatives’. This is
ßN+1^¶N+1 in E and º and so the graph of r is (1-1) reducible to (s©T )(N+2).
37
Q.E.D.(2)
Hence
(3) T kÆ ∑1 (rÆ°1©TÆ°1)(N+2+k).
By 1) wemay absorb the rÆ°1 here. Then we have TÆ ∑1 (TÆ°1)(!). Q.E.D.
5 Conclusions
Is there a simpler way of proving the non-decreasing nature of the H-sets?
(Probably if there was, this would work for the F -sets too.) In one sense the
above argument is indirect: it does not principally use the definition of the H-
sets directly; but rather uses the L∞-hierarchy of iterated definability. Possibly
there is a direct argument. It might at first sight seem odd that it is difficult to
show that the H-sets are non-decreasing with index, but that most simple way
of ensuring this conclusion - by arguing that the stock of ß1-sentences in the
H± must increase with index as new ß1 facts become true - cannot be deployed.
This is because there are large stretches of ordinals [Ø,∞] Ω ≥ where no new ß1
set-theoretical sentences become true in the L± for ± in the interval [Ø,∞]; this
must happen by the nature of the ordinals (≥,ß). Since we may run a mirror of
the revision process inside the L-hierarchy, and themembership in such internal
H-sets and those constructed externally, is absolute, there will a fortiori, during
those stretches [Ø,∞], be no newpersistingß1 truths entering theH-sets. So, that
relatively simple argument is ruled out: we must step up to ß2 ‘facts’, and using
the definable ß2 wellorderings seems then as good a way as any.
In the above we have concentrated on the ground model for L asM = ,
the standard model of arithmetic. This is only for perspicuousness: almost any
other model would be substitutable here: if the model contains a copy of the
natural numbers, this is particularly easy. For modelsM = VÆ say, the set of all
sets of rank less than a fixed Æ (Æ not necessarily an cardinal) one may effect
the above in at least two ways: either by assuming that the ground language
LM contains a constant cx for every x 2VÆ, and then constructing an H- or F -
sequence overM . This would have length the corresponding ordinal ≥(M ) and
would be least such that there is ß(M ) with L≥(M )(M )¡ß2 Lß(M )(M ). One may
then use the arguments above to talk about determinateness paths of length up
to this new ≥(M ); ineffable liars can be constructed in such contexts.
Another approach is to add to the Tr predicate a satisfaction predicate (as
for example Field indicates in his book for the F -model he builds, using “True-
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of”). This would again give rise to the same ordinals. ForM = VÆ then these
approaches yield uncountable ordinals ≥(M ) > Æ. However forM not of this
form, as long as we require that objects inM have names in the languageLM
and wemay form diagonalising functions etc. then the above is all possible. The
ideas above will suffice in these other contexts, by building the appropriate con-
structible hierarchies over the chosenM . The notions of recursive and r.e. have
to be abandoned for other appropriate forms of uniform definability.
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